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Priority No. 2 
* 
SANTOS DOMINGUEZ, JR. * Case No. 9811781CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from the restitution amount imposed after Appellant plead guilty to one 
count of Burglary, a Second Degree Felony in violation of U.C.A. §76-6-202 (1953, As Amended). 
The Honorable Stanton M. Taylor of the Second District Court in Weber County accepted 
Appellant's plea of guilty on March 23, 1998 . At the sentencing hearing held on April 27, 1998, the 
trial court imposed a sentence of 180 days in the Weber County Jail, probation, and restitution to be 
paid to the following: the victim, the State for extradition costs, and to Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Company for medical coverages they provided for the victim. A Restitution Hearing was held on 
September 14, 1998 and the trial court signed a memorandum decision upholding all restitution 
amounts on October 26, 1998. The memorandum decision was entered on November 9, 1998. 
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Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeal pursuant to 
U.C. A. §78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953, As Amended) and Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
The Trial Court Abused its Discretion When it Ordered That the Life Insurance Company 
Was a Victim as Defined by the Restitution Statute and Found That the Amounts Paid by the 
Insurance Company Were "Uninsured" Losses. 
Standard of Review 
An appellate court will not vacate an order of restitution unless the trial court abused the 
discretion or exceeded its authority. State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
However, if the trial court's order is premised on statutory interpretation, as it is here, the appellate 
court will afford the trial court's interpretation no deference and review for correctness. Ward v. 
Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757 (Utah 1990). 
Citation to the Record 
The Appellant preserved his right to appeal the restitution amount by objecting to the amount 
of restitution imposed. The Appellant brought an objection to the Court's attention at the sentencing 
hearing (R. 68-69), by filing a memorandum in opposition to restitution (R. 36-38) and again at the 
restitution hearing. (R. 75-76) 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION. STATUES AND RULES 
U.C.A. §76-3-201(4)(a)(l) 
(Prior to the May 4,1998 Amendment) 
When a person is convicted of criminal activity that resulted in pecuniary 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall 
order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in 
this subsection, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make 
restitution as part of a plea agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim 
has the meaning as defined in Section 77-38-2 and family member as 
defined in Section 77-37-2. (Emphasis Added) 
U.CA. §77-38-2(9)(a) 
"Victim of a crime" means any natural person against whom the charged 
crime or conduct is alleged to have been perpetrated or attempted by the 
defendant or minor personally or as a party to the offense or conduct or, in the 
discretion of the court, against whom a related crime or act is alleged to have 
been perpetrated or attempted, unless the natural person is the accused or 
appears to be accountable or otherwise criminally responsible for or criminally 
involved in the crime or conduct or a crime or act arising from the same 
conduct, criminal episode, or plan as the crime is defined under the laws of 
this state. 
U.C.A. §76-3-201(4)(a)(l) 
(After the May 4, 1998 Amendment) 
When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall 
order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in 
this subsection, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make 
restitution as part of a plea agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim 
has the meaning as defined in Subsection (l)(e). (Emphasis Added) 
U.C.A. §76-3-201(l)(e) 
(After May 4, 1998 Amendment) 
(I) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered 
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal 
activities 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the trial court's imposition of restitution in the amount of $4,793.57 
payable to Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. The health insurance carrier was not a victim as 
defined under the statute in effect at the time of the Defendant's sentencing. Therefore, it was an 
abuse of discretion for the trial court to order restitution payable to the health insurance company. 
The State never disputed the fact that Metropolitan Life Insurance Company paid $4,793.57 
in medical bills incurred by the victim and no evidence was brought to the attention of the trial court 
to indicate anything to the contrary. However, the trial court ruled that Restitution in the full amount 
would remain because it was an "uninsured loss". 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant, Santos Dominguez, was charged with Burglary after an incident wherein he 
entered a mobile home in Ogden, Utah and assaulted the victim, Matthew Hawkins, a minor. (R. 1-2) 
Mr. Hawkins was taken to Davis North Medical Center on the evening of the assault and later 
underwent reconstructive surgery to repair the damage that was caused by the assault. Mr. Hawkins' 
medical bills totaled $6,847.98. The victim was covered under his mother's insurance policy through 
Metropolitan Life. The insurance company paid 70% of the bills after the deductible of $500.00. 
Therefore, the victim's out of pocket expenses totaled $2,554.41 and the insurance company paid 
$4,793.57. 
Mr. Dominguez fled the state shortly after the incident and an arrest warrant was issued on 
October 21, 1996. (R. 6) Mr. Dominguez was arrested in Phoenix, Arizona on January 26, 1998 and 
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was extradited to Ogden on February 11, 1998. The State incurred costs in the amount of $376.75 
for the extradition. 
Mr. Dominguez plead guilty as charged on March 23, 1998 and was sentenced on April 27, 
1998. In exchange for the plea, the State agreed to remain silent at sentencing. No agreement was 
reached regarding restitution through the plea negotiation. (R. 26-30) At the sentencing hearing, the 
trial court followed the recommendations in the Defendant's pre-sentence investigation report and 
imposed restitution to the victim for $2,554.41, the State in the amount of $376.75 and to the 
insurance company in the amount of $4,793.57; for a total restitution amount of $7,724.73. (R. 31-
33) Defense counsel immediately made an inquiry into the validity of the restitution to the insurance 
company. (R. 68) In response, the trial court stated: "My understanding is I can order restitution and, 
and he is responsible for whatever, whatever damages arose by reason of his conduct. If you can 
show me some authority that says I can't I'll be glad to consider that..." (R. 69) Rather than set a 
restitution hearing at that time, the Judge recommended that the matter be addressed on an informal 
basis. (R. 70) Despite the obvious objection of Appellant, the trial court issued its Judgment and 
Conviction providing for restitution to Metropolitan Life in the amount of $4,793.57. (R. 31-33) 
The Appellant, through his counsel, filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Restitution citing 
to relative authority on May 15, 1998. (R. 36-38) When no response was received by the State or 
the trial court, he filed a Request for Restitution Hearing. (R. 39-40) A restitution hearing was held 
on September 14, 1998. At that hearing, all parties agreed that the controlling factor on determining 
whether or not Metropolitan Life Insurance was a victim would depend on the effective date of the 
new statute revising the definition of victim. (R. 76) Counsel faxed copies of the new statute showing 
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the effective date of the new statute was effective May 4, 1998 and; therefore, not applicable to 
Appellant in the sentencing phase. (R. 45-50) 
Despite the agreement between all parties, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision finding 
that the loss was "uninsured" and that restitution remained in the full amount, thus making Appellant 
responsible to Metropolitan Life. (R. 51-52) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion in ordering restitution to Metropolitan Life Insurance 
because they were not a victim of a crime as defined in the restitution statute in effect at the time of 
Appellant's sentencing. Mr. Dominguez was sentenced on April 27, 1998. The restitution statute 
was amended by legislation and re-defined the term "victim" as it applies to restitution. Under the 
new statute "victim" includes all persons whom suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the 
defendant's criminal activity. Although enacted prior to the sentencing of Appellant, the new statute 
did not become effective until May 4, 1998. Therefore, the new statute was not applicable to the 
Appellant's case and any restitution amounts awarded to Metropolitan Life should be vacated by this 
Court. Additionally, the trial court's finding that the loss was "uninsured", is not supported by the 




THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
IT ORDERED THAT THE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
WAS A VICTIM AS DEFINED BY THE RESTITUTION 
STATUTE AND FOUND THAT THE AMOUNTS PAID 
BY THE INSURANCE COMPANY WERE "UNINSURED" LOSSES 
An appellate court will not vacate an order of restitution unless the trial court abused the 
discretion or exceeded its authority. State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
However, if the trial court's order is premised on statutory interpretation, as it is here, the appellate 
court will afford the trial court's interpretation no deference and review for correctness. Ward v. 
Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757 (Utah 1990). 
In the case at bar, the Appellant committed the crime of Burglary on September 8, 1996, 
plead guilty to Burglary on March 23, 1998 and was sentenced on April 27, 1998. The restitution 
statute in effect at the time of the commission of Appellant's crime and at the time of sentencing 
included two separate definitions of victim. 
The first definition appeared at U.C.A. §76-3-20l(l)(e)(I) (1). The old statute defined victim 
as any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the 
defendant's criminal activities. The second definition of victim found at U.C.A. 76-3-201(4)(a)(I) 
(hereinafter referred to as "old statute") stated that u...for purposes of restitution, a victim has the 
meaning as defined in Section 77-38-2" (emphasis added) 
Section 77-38-2(9)(a) defines victim as "any person against whom the charged crime or 
conduct is alleged to have been perpetrated or attempted by the defendant or minor personally or as 
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a party to the offense or conduct, or, in the discretion of the court, against whom a related crime or 
act is alleged to have been perpetrated or attempted." 
Under this subsection a court must order restitution to the person or persons against whom 
the defendant perpetrated the crime. Under the plain language defining "victim" in subsection (4)(a), 
an insurance company which has merely covered the victim's losses is not a victim since the crime was 
not perpetrated against the insurance company personally or as a party. 
In State v. Westerman^ 945 P.2d 695 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), this Court reviewed a case almost 
identical to the one before it now. In Westerman, this Court held that with the conflicting definitions 
of victim, the Court was required to use the definition that specifically addresses when and to whom 
restitution should be made and ruled that an insurance company is not a victim as defined in section 
76-3-201. Id. 
The Legislature has since addressed the propriety of restitution orders for amounts covered 
by a victim's insurance and took the Westerman court up on its suggestion to "enact remedial 
legislation," dealing with any unintended effects of that decision. See 1998 Utah Laws ch. 149, § 1. 
Hence, effective May 4, 1998, the restitution statute defines "victim" as "any person whom the court 
determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(l)(e)(I) (Supp. 1998) (hereinafter referred to as "new statute"). Under the 
new statute, trial courts have the authority to order a defendant to pay restitution to an insurance 
company, contrary to the provisions of the old statute. 
Despite the 1998 amendment to the restitution statute, the trial court abused its discretion in 
determining that Appellant pay restitution to the insurance company. At all times relative to the 
Appellant's case, the old statute was still in effect and the insurance company could not be considered 
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a victim for restitution purposes. The crime occurred in October of 1996, the Appellant plead guilty 
on March 23, 1998 and was sentenced on April 27, 1998. All of these dates were prior to the new 
restitution going into effect. Additionally, it should be noted that the prosecuting attorney, the 
defense attorney, and the trial court all agreed that the effective date of the statute would be 
controlling in determining whether or not Metropolitan Life could be considered for restitution. The 
trial court specifically stated: 
If the effective date of the statute was before April 27th the Court would 
order restitution in the total amount that it was. If the effective date of the 
statute was after sentencing then the Court would go with the $2,000 
whatever. (R. 76) 
Defense counsel pulled the new statute, with current amendment notes, from Utah Law on 
Disk and faxed it to the trial court and the prosecutor's office to note the 1998 amendment note on 
October 23, 1998. The amendment note referred to in the faxed letter reads: 
The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, in Subsection (4)(a)(I) 
substituted "Subsection (l)(e)" for "Section 77-382" and deleted "and family 
member has the meaning as defined in Section 77-37-2" from the end and 
changed the style of the internal references in Subsections 5(c)(1), (5)(c))ii), 
and (8)(c). See U.C.A. §76-3-201 Amendment Notes (1998 Supp.) 
Even after having a stipulation entered into the record, the trial court issued a ruling upholding 
the full amount of restitution based upon its finding that "restitution is to be an uninsured loss". It 
is clear that the trial court went beyond its discretion in ruling that Metropolitan Life was a victim as 
defined under the old statute and the trial court's finding that "restitution is to be an uninsured loss" 
is not supported by the record and should be facially dismissed. No evidence was presented by the 
State to suggest that the loss was uninsured. If the loss was "uninsured" as suggested by the trial 
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court, Metropolitan Life would not be involved in this case, and no objection to the restitution order 
would ever have been made. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon argument set forth above, it is clear that the trial court abused its discretion in 
ordering the Appellant to pay restitution to Metropolitan Life. Therefore, the restitution order 
requiring Appellant to pay restitution to Metropolitan Life in the amount of $4,793.57 should be 
vacated and the restitutio** order should be amended to include only the costs actually paid by the 
victim and the costs associated with extradition, i.e. $2,554.41. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /Q day of March, 1999. 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, two (2) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to the following: 
Attorney General's Office 
ATTN: Criminal Appeals 
160 East 300 South, 6th floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
DATED this / D_ day of March, 1999. 
thafr'B. Pace 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
Transcript of Sentencing Hearing 


























IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
SANTOS DOMINGUEZ, JR., 
Defendant. 
SENTENCING HEARING 
Case No. 961901139 
Hon. Stanton M. Taylor 
APPEAL # 9811781 
BE IT REMEMBERED that this matter came on for 
hearing before the above-named court on April 27th, 
1998 . 
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and 
represented by counsel, the following proceedings 
were held: 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE STATE: 
BRENDA BEATON, ESQ. 
DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY 
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., 2ND FLOOR 
OGDEN UT 84401 
FOR THE DEFENDANT 
JONATHAN B. PACE, ESQ 
2564 WASHINGTON BLVD 
OGDEN UT 4401 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR - LIC. 2 2-102811-7801 
10445 SOUTH 600 EAST, SALEM, UT 84653 
PHONE: 423-1009 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 ( A P R I L 2 7 , 1 9 9 8 ) 
3 THE JUDGE: Mr. Pace? 
4 MR. PACE: Number 14, Your Honor. 
5 Santos Dominguez. Santos Dominguez. 
6 THE JUDGE: State versus Santos 
7 Dominguez, Junior. 
8 MR. PACE: Your Honor, this is, it's for 
9 sentencing today and we have gone over-- Is that 
10 right? 
11 THE JUDGE: Yes. 
12 MR. PACE: We've gone over the 
13 recommendation. There are a few things that we, 
14 that aren't exactly right in here but the overall 
15 recommendation is, is very fair and Santos is 
16 excited about that. 
17 I don't know if the Court got all the 
18 letters from family members and from everyone that 
19 I did but he's got a lot of support. He's a good 
20 person. He is going to follow probation, he'll do 
21 a great job. He's excited to get paying back the 
22 restitution, feels terrible about what he did and 
23 it's not going to happen again. 
24 And so if the Court is going to follow the 
25 recommendation we don't have anything further. 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER 
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1 II THE JUDGE: Does the State wish to be 
2 heard? 
3 MS. BEATON: Your Honor, Mr. Heward 
4 agreed to remain silent in exchange for the 
5 defendant's plea. 
6 THE JUDGE: Okay. There's a couple of 
7 things I would like to say preparatory. I am going 
8 to follow the recommendation. 
9 There were two aspects of this case that 
10 really bothered me. You know he, he has talked 
11 about how sorry he felt about what he had done. 
12 But the thing that really bothers me is him saying 
13 I felt really bad about what I did but I ran, I 
14 left the State and my, my family protected me so 
15 that, so that I wouldn't be arrested in Arizona. 
16 And I'm reading through the lines, Mr. Pace. But 
17 when the police tried to contact him at his 
18 mother's place she protected him, wouldn't tell 
19 her, tell them where he was. 
20 And, and if he felt so bad about it and 
21 [[ was so willing to assume responsibility I don't 
22 II know why he was hiding in Arizona until, until he 
23 was arrested. If he felt that bad I would have 
24 thought he would have squared his shoulders and 
25 || come back and taken care of this and I would be 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER 
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1 much more impressed with what he had to say. 
2 I want him to understand that I'm glad he, 
3 you know, that he was able to convince probation 
4 that he felt really bad and was willing to assume 
5 that responsibility. But he'd better understand 
6 that had they recommended prison he'd be on his 
7 way. 
8 MR. PACE: We understand. 
9 THE JUDGE: It's the order of the Court 
10 that the prison sentence of not less than one or 
11 more than 15 years be suspended. The conditions 
12 of probation, six months in the county jail with 
13 credit for 92 days. Restitution amount of 
14 $7, 724 . 73 . 
15 MR. PACE: Your Honor, could I interrupt 
16 you there also? I'd completely forgotten about the 
17 restitution. And this is my legal question. My 
18 understanding is case law right now is that 
19 restitution to hospitals, and that's what a lot of 
20 it, or to the insurance company, the Court is not 
21 allowed to, to order that. Am I correct on that 
22 or is that, am I completely wrong? 
23 THE JUDGE: That's not my understanding. 
24 My understanding is I can order restitution and, 
25 and he is responsible for whatever, whatever 



























damages arose by reason of his conduct. If you 
can show me some authority that says I can't I'll 
be glad to consider that, Mr. Pace. 
MR. PACE: Maybe what we'd better do is 
set a restitution hearing on that. I've just seen 
some case law recently saying that insurance 
companies don't have the authority to claim 
restitution. I'd have to bring--
MS. BEATON: I thought they'd altered 
Pardon me? What was that? 
I thought they'd altered 
Not unless it took effect 
that by legislation. 
MR. PACE: 
MS. BEATON: 
that by legislation. 
MR. GRAVIS: 
this year. 
MS. BEATON: I think they did. 
NR. PACE: Well maybe I'd--
THE JUDGE: Well why don't you look at 
it. We know all the figures. The figures are the 
figures and--
MR. PACE: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: -- if you can show me some 
authority to the contrary I'll be glad to consider 
that . 
MR. PACE: And should I set a restitution 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER 
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1 hearing or should we just — 
2 THE JUDGE: No, I don't think it's 
3 necessary to do that. 
4 MR. PACE: Okay. 
5 THE JUDGE: It's something I suppose we 
6 could handle on an informal basis. 
7 MR. PACE: That sounds fine. Yes. We 
8 understand what the two different figures are. 
9 THE JUDGE: Yes. 
10 MR. PACE: And we're agreed t o -
ll THE JUDGE: I want him employed on a 
12 full-time basis. And if probation agreed or felt 
13 it would be appropriate to compact him back to 
14 Arizona I certainly wouldn't have any problem with 
15 that but I'll leave that within the discretion of 
16 Adult Probation and Parole. 
17 MR. PACE: He does have a good job, it's 
18 still waiting so--
19 THE JUDGE: And all of the other normal 
20 I] terms of probation. And if, if the jail wanted to 
21 l\ give him statutory good time I wouldn't have any 
22 || problem with that either on the balance. 
23 II MR. PACE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
24 II WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded. 
25 || (See reporter's certificate at 9-14-98 transcript.) 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER 
PAGE 7 
ADDENDUM "B" 
Transcript of Restitution Hearing 


























IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
SANTOS DOMINGUEZ, JR., 
Defendant. 
RESTITUTION HEARING 
Case No. 961901139 
Hon. Stanton M. Taylor 
APPEAL # 9811781 
BE IT REMEMBERED that this matter came on fo 
hearing before the above-named court on September 
14th, 1998. 
WHEREUPON, the defendant not appearing but 
represented by counsel, the following proceedings 
were held: 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE STATE: 
WILLIAM F. DAINES, ESQ. 
DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY 
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., 2ND FLOOR 
OGDEN UT 84401 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
JONATHAN B. PACE, ESQ 
2564 WASHINGTON BLVD 
OGDEN UT 4401 



























P R O C E E D I N G S 
(September 14, 1998). 
MR. PACE: Your Honor, could we go to 
#25? 
THE JUDGE: We could, Mr. Pace. 
MR. PACE: Santos Dominguez. Thank you. 
Your Honor, this is set for restitution 
hearing. I haven't seen Santos come yet but I 
think we could hopefully resolve it today without 
waiting for him. 
THE JUDGE: All right. State of Utah 
versus Santos Dominguez, Jr. 
MR. PACE: And it's set for restitution 
hearing, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: I knew that. 
MR. PACE: Santos entered a plea of 
guilty and was sentenced back in April. We 
requested that he, the restitution be set at $2,500 
and, let's see. Wait. Yes, $2,554.41. And the 
Court I think has entered restitution in the amount 
of $7,724. And our argument is that the insurance 
company has paid $4,793 of that total amount. 
And we've researched the law on it and it 
looks like the legislature is considering or has 
passed a bill possibly that would allow the Court 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER 
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1 to order restitution to insurance companies as a 
2 victim but as of the date that we wrote our memo 
3 the Court was still, or the legislature still had 
4 not enacted the bill allowing the Court to order 
5 that restitution to an insurance company. So 
6 they're still basically relying on the Westerman 
7 case. 
8 MR. DAINES: Mr. Pace, who's case is 
9 this? Is this a certified juvenile? 
10 MR. PACE: No. 
11 MR. DAINES: Isn't this Michaela's 
12 case? 
13 MR. PACE: No. I think it was Dean 
14 Saunders I think. I don't know. I can't remember 
15 now. He's not a juvenile. 
16 MR. DAINES: Yes. I think we have a 
17 prosecutor who will be here to argue this case, 
18 Your Honor. 
19 THE CLERK:? The information is signed 
20 by Gary Heward. 
21 MR. PACE: Well, maybe it's Gary Heward. 
22 That's probably right. Yes. 
23 THE JUDGE: Is Mr. Heward going to be 
24 here today then? 
25 MR. DAINES: It won't be Mr. Heward. For 
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1 some reason it has an M on it. I would think it's 
2 Michaela's case. 
3 MR. PACE: I talked to Michaela today. 
4 1 don't think she was planning on coming over here. 
5 THE JUDGE: Why don't we do this--
6 MR. DAINES: Well, I don't agree with his 
7 assessment here but I wasn't prepared to argue it. 
8 And my recollection is the legislature did pass 
9 such a bill in the last legislature. 
10 THE JUDGE: Yes. I think it would have 
11 become effective in May. So if the--
12 MR. PACE: That would be after he was 
13 sentenced anyway. 
14 THE JUDGE: After sentencing on that. 
15 Yes. If that date was after the sentencing date, 
16 that was the date that I've ordered restitution 
17 payable and on that date if the, if the bill had 
18 not been--
19 MR. DAINES: When he-- See I don't have 
20 a file because according to our calendar--
21 THE JUDGE: Let me see the file here. 
22 II MR. DAINES: -- one of the, one of the 
23 II lawyers has his file and probably wants to argue 
24 that. 
25 THE JUDGE: Well, let's see- -
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1 MR. PACE: Sentencing was the 23rd of 
2 March. I mean, he entered the plea the 23rd of 
3 March. The 27th of April is when he was 
4 sentenced. 
5 MR. DAINES: That would really be close 
6 if it's the 27th of April. 
7 THE JUDGE: Yes, 27th of April. On what 
8 date--
9 MR. DAINES: It's usually around the 24th 
10 but not exactly the 24th of April that the first 
11 bills become law. 
12 THE JUDGE: It's 90 days after 
13 legislation. 
14 MR. DAINES: Yes. So if we may pass this 
15 so I can see one, if somebody wants to argue this 
16 and two, I'm not prepared to argue it. My 
17 recollection is the statute was passed and Mr. Pace 
18 is saying the statute isn't in the code. Is that 
19 correct? 
20 MR. PACE: That's what-- My paralegal 
21 researched it, informed me and she couldn't find 
22 where it, even the date of the memo it hadn't been 
23 enacted so I don't know for sure. 
24 MR. DAINES: That's my recollection is 
25 they passed this legislature, Your Honor. 



























MR. PACE: And I guess what we could do 
is stipulate that if, if it had passed before the 
27th of April he'd, he'd agree. 
THE JUDGE: 
MR. DAINES 
All right. Let's do that. 




If it's effective. 
Yes. Effective I think is 
what the key is, that it's an effective--
THE JUDGE: The statute, the effective 
date of the statute. 
MR. PACE: Right. 
THE JUDGE: If the effective date of the 
statute was before April 27th then the Court would 
order the $7,100 figure. If the effective d a t e -
Excuse me, the other way around. 
If the effective date of the statute was 
before April 27th the Court would order restitution 
in the total amount that it was. If the effective 
date of the statute was after sentencing then the 
Court would go with the $2,000 whatever. 
MR. DAINES: What is the other amount 
just in case? 
MR. PACE: Do you want both the 
amounts? I just closed it. $2,554.41. 



























MR. DAINES: What's the higher one? 
MR. PACE: The higher amount was 
$7,724 . 73 . 
MR. DAINES: All right. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Thank you. 
WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded. 
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